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Abstract
Online peer-to-peer platforms match service providers with consumers. Both providers
and consumers derive heterogeneous payoffs depending onwhom they are matched with.
To ensure that providers and consumers identify the most valuable matches, many of
these platforms elicit relevant information from and also disclose the information to the
market participants by adopting bilateral review schemes. Although the bilateral review
scheme has its own merits in reducing information asymmetry and possibly enabling
better matches, its impact on the various stakeholders in online peer-to-peer platforms
remains unexplored. We show that, in equilibrium, the bilateral review scheme intensi-
fies price competition among service providers to attract low-cost consumers and con-
sequently reduces the platform’s profit. Interestingly, service providers may be better off
withmore intense price competition and lower priceswhen the proportion of low-cost con-
sumers is sufficiently high. More importantly, we find that social welfare is not always
higher under the bilateral review scheme compared to either the unilateral review scheme
or no reviews. Our findings demonstrate that even though the bilateral review scheme
eliminates the information asymmetry and adverse selection on both sides of the market,
it does not necessarily enhance market efficiency when competing providers strategically
respond to reviews by adjusting their prices.
Keywords: sharing economy, bilateral reviews, competition, analytical modeling, eco-
nomics of IS
Introduction
The sharing economy has enjoyed a steep growth during the last decade, driven mostly by online peer-to-
peer platforms. These platforms have emerged for awide range of services such as transportation (e.g., Uber,
Lyft), accommodation (e.g., Airbnb), labor contracting (e.g., TaskRabbit, Upwork) and consumer loans (e.g.,
Lending Club, Prosper) (Einav et al. 2016). A primary objective of such platforms is to facilitate proper
matches between service providers (hereafter, providers) and service seekers (hereafter, consumers) be-
cause both providers and consumers could derive different payoffs depending on whom they are matched
with (Romanyuk 2017). To meet this objective, many of these platforms elicit and disclose information
about market participants by adopting a bilateral review scheme (Ke et al. 2017). Unlike the more prevalent
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Figure 1. Uber (a sharing economy platform for transportation services) uses a bilateral rat-
ing scheme where a star rating for drivers (on the left) and a star rating for riders (on the
right) are given after each transaction.
unilateral review scheme in which only consumers provide reviews about providers, many peer-to-peer plat-
forms also allow a provider to write reviews about a consumer. For instance, in Airbnb, a potential guest can
observe reviews about a host to assess the quality of the host’s service before deciding whether to submit a
request to a specific host. Each host, in turn, can observe the reviews about a guest to assess how easy/costly
it is to serve her before deciding whether to accept the guest’s request.
The need for a bilateral review scheme in a peer-to-peer platform stems from an important distinction be-
tween peer-to-peer contexts and marketplaces where unilateral review schemes are adopted. Consider the
Amazonmarketplace, which employs a unilateral review scheme where consumers rate sellers’ products. In
this marketplace, a seller’s cost of serving a consumer does not vary across consumers. Therefore, sellers do
not have any preference regarding the consumers they serve.1 Essentially, only consumers have a preference
for sellers and a choice regarding from which seller to buy becomes a key issue in traditional marketplaces.
In such a context, a unilateral review (product and/or seller) scheme is sufficient to help consumers miti-
gate their uncertainty about product quality and fit (Hong and Pavlou 2014; Kwark et al. 2014). In contrast,
providers in peer-to-peer sharing platforms incur different costs depending on the type of consumers they
serve, and they can choose to serve or not serve a consumer. For instance, in Airbnb, providers incur less
cost to serve consumers who are responsible and follow the rules of the property, referred to as low-cost
consumers (Jin et al. 2017), compared to misbehaving consumers, referred to as high-cost consumers, who
could damage the property and increase the provider’s cost. Moreover, providers can varywith respect to the
quality of their service, which also affects their cost. For example, a luxury property has higher maintenance
and cleaning costs compared to a simple property, like a regular apartment. When providers incur hetero-
geneous costs to serve to different segments of consumers, they would desire to have information about a
consumer’s type before engaging in a transaction. Similar to Airbnb, in Uber, a driver has an option to filter
out the requests from consumers with poor reviews (Ke et al. 2017). Since both providers and consumers
derive heterogeneous payoffs depending on whom they are matched with, a bilateral review scheme may
become less desirable in the peer-to-peer markets. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the ratings in Uber and Airbnb
respectively.
The main premise of a review scheme, whether unilateral or bilateral, is that it mitigates the information
asymmetry among market participants. Information asymmetry between consumers and sellers may have
detrimental effects on the market and may lead to a market failure due to adverse selection (Akerlof 1978).
The impact of one-sided information asymmetry and adverse selection has been extensively studied in the
1Moreover, the laws and regulations force sellers in these marketplaces not to discriminate against certain consumers.
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Figure 2. AirBnB (a sharing economy platform for accommodation) hosts discuss what to do
with bad guests in online forums. One host claims that she lost money due to high cleaning
cost. Another article mentions how to attract great guests to avoid property damages.
literature in domains ranging from insurance, health care, to labor markets (Cutler and Reber 1998; Finkel-
stein and Poterba 2004; Greenwald 1986). However, the two-sided information asymmetry and adverse
selection has received little attention. The emergence of the sharing economy has highlighted the signifi-
cance of two-sided adverse selection issue. In this paper, we study the strategic implications of a bilateral
review scheme on various stakeholders in online peer-to-peer marketplaces to provide insights into shar-
ing platforms. We perform the analysis by developing a game theoretical model of a platform that matches
consumers of heterogeneous serving costs and providers of varying qualities.
Our analysis reveals several interesting findings that have important implications for the platform, providers,
consumers, and the society. We show that the bilateral review scheme intensifies the price competition
among service providers as they lower their prices in equilibrium to attract the low-cost consumers. In-
tensified price competition, in turn, reduces the platform’s profit. Interestingly, service providers may be
better off with more intense price competition and lower prices when the proportion of low-cost consumers
are sufficiently high. These results are driven by the fact that under the bilateral review scheme cost to
serve is revealed, thereby enabling service providers to attract low-cost consumers with reduced prices to
diminish their cost to serve. More importantly, we find that social welfare is not always higher under the
bilateral review scheme, compared to the unilateral scheme or no reviews. Hence, our findings demonstrate
that the bilateral review scheme, which reduces the information asymmetry and adverse selection between
market participants, does not necessarily enhance market efficiency when providers strategically respond
to information in reviews by adjusting their prices.
Prior Literature and Contributions
This paper primarily contributes to the growing literature on peer-to-peer markets (Einav et al. 2016; Jin
et al. 2017; Ke et al. 2017; Tadelis 2016) and to the vast literature on adverse selection. While the literature
on peer-to-peer markets has examined operational and strategic aspects such as platform competition, our
work relates specifically to the impact of bilateral reviews in peer-to-peer markets. Ke et al. (2017) show
that bilateral ratings facilitate customer segmentation based on the cost to serve them and may result in
higher market prices. In their model, consumers search and individually apply to providers, which leads
to several inefficiencies due to search frictions and rejections by service providers. In contrast, we consider
a scenario in which the online peer-to-peer platform matches providers with consumers to eliminate the
search frictions and other inefficiencies. Thus, our study highlights the role of bilateral ratings whenmarket
efficiency is determined solely by consumer valuation and cost to serve consumers. Jin et al. (2017) show
that bilateral ratings may lead to over-selective behavior of providers in which they turn down many con-
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sumers, thus resulting in a decline in service quality. Jin et al. (2017) also considers a setting in which the
platform sets the price of each transaction. Our paper differs from this in that service providers strategically
choose their prices in our model, which is consistent with online peer-to-peer platforms such as Airbnb,
Turo, TaskRabbit, etc.
Our work contributes to the literature on two-sided adverse selection. Soberman (1999) introduces the
term “double adverse selection” in the context of product warranties, and states that when double adverse
selection exists, buyers do not know the seller’s product quality, and sellers do not know the buyer’s type
(preference). He examines product warranties as both a screening and a signalling mechanism. Gale (2001)
studies two-sided adverse selection in the context of a labor market that has high-skilled and low-skilled
workers, and workers have preferred and non-preferred firms. The primary objective is to characterize the
equilibrium paths in such a market. Our definition of two-sided adverse selection varies slightly from the
above two definitions in that both providers and consumers have heterogeneous types and they realize het-
erogeneous payoffs when matched with different types. Second, we focus on the effects of adverse selection
on society and market participants, as opposed to the earlier studies’ focus on the characterization of the
equilibrium. As established by Akerlof (1978), adverse selection of consumers may lead to market failure
and diminish social welfare. We examine whether the detrimental effects of adverse selection are more se-
vere when it is two-sided. More importantly, the peer-to-peer context we consider in this paper has several
distinctive characteristics not examined by the traditional literature on adverse selection. For instance, in
our context, the supply is finite, causing the provider-side price competition to be fundamentally different
in high demand and low demand scenarios, whereas the prior literature has assumed that all demand can
be met by suppliers. Furthermore, unlike in peer-to-peer markets, the notion of a platform that matches
providers with consumers does not exist in traditional markets.
Our study is also related to the literature on information disclosure in matching markets. There exists a
long-standing debate in this stream of work on whether, and to what degree, information disclosure is ben-
eficial in matching markets. Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2015) shows that information disclosure helps in
matching heterogeneous buyers to sellers of varying quality. Romanyuk (2017) reveals that full information
disclosure is inefficient due to excessive rejections by sellers in matching platforms. He also concludes that
a simple policy with partial disclosure restores the efficiency when the platform observes the preferences
of sellers. Hoppe et al. (2009) shows that information disclosure leads to wasteful signaling which offsets
the benefits of improved matching. Einav et al. (2016) points out that the trade-off between eliciting dis-
persed information and minimizing transaction costs in online peer-to-peer markets is important to keep
the users happy. In contrast to many models in this stream of literature, we abstract away from platform’s
information disclosure policy (i.e., whether to disclosure partial or full information, whether to aggregate or
disperse information, etc.) in order to focus on the impact of the bilateral review scheme, which has already
been adopted by many peer-to-peer platforms, on various stakeholders.
Finally, our study relates to the literature on the use and manipulation of online reviews by firms for pricing
strategies (Dellarocas 2006; Kwark et al. 2017; Li 2017; Li et al. 2011). Li et al. (2011) concludes that online
product reviews influence firms’ pricing decisions for products with repeated purchases. Kwark et al. (2017)
show that retailers can use the upstream pricing scheme as a strategic tool to benefit from online product
reviews. Li (2017) identifies conditions under which revealing average ratings is more profitable than not
revealing them. Tunc et al. (2017) examine how aggregation of online reviews affects the upstream price
competition depending on factors such as review precision and the extent of differentiation. In contrast,
we consider the strategic implications of the bilateral review scheme in peer-to-peer markets to reduce the
asymmetry of information between service providers and consumers to facilitate better matching. Specif-
ically, we focus on the impact of disclosing a consumer’s type (i.e., the cost of serving the consumer) to
providers on price competition among providers and subsequent matching decisions by the sharing plat-
form.
Model
We consider an online peer-to-peer sharing platform (R) that hasM competing providers, who are indexed
by j, andN consumers, who are indexed by i. Provider j sets price pj for his service and the platform charges
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a commission equal to α fraction of the price for each matched transaction. The platform deploys an online
review system that provides information about the providers and consumers. Consumers, each of whomhas
unit demand, use provider reviews to decide which provider to seek the service from. Similarly, providers
use consumer reviews to choose which type of consumers they prefer to serve. Finally, the platformmatches
providers with consumers based on the preferences on both sides.
Provider j has a service quality of qj , which is a vertical quality in the sense that all consumers prefer more
of service quality to less, ceteris paribus. We assume, for expositional clarity, that a service quality takes
a value of either high or low, i.e., qj ∈ {qH , qL}. The proportion of high-quality providers is denoted by ρ.
For providers, consumers are heterogeneous in terms of the cost to serve them. The consumer i has type θi
which takes a value of either high or low, i.e., θi ∈ {θH , θL}, θH > θL. The proportion of low type consumers
in the market is represented by γ. We assume, for analytical tractability, that the proportions of low type
consumers and high-quality providers are common knowledge. We also point out that a service provider
can only serve one consumer at a given time.
Provider j incurs a cost to serve a consumer i, denoted as ci,j . A provider incurs a higher cost to serve a high-
cost consumer than a low-cost consumer. Moreover, a provider’s cost to serve is higher when the service is
of higher quality (Ke et al. 2017). Therefore, we assume that provider j’s cost to serve consumer i is given by
ci,j = θ
iqj . We assume that θH < 1 so that no provider would turn away any consumer, even the high-cost
ones. Consumer i’s net utility from being served by provider j is given by Ui,j = qj − pj . Provider j’s net
profit from serving consumer i is given by pii,j = (1− α)pj − θiqj .
The game proceeds as follows. In stage 1, providers simultaneously set their prices, either pL or pH . In stage
2, consumers submit their preference to the platform (i.e. either high or low quality provider) based on their
expected net utility. Consumers prefer a high-quality service provider if qH−pH ≥ qL−pL, and a low-quality
service provider, otherwise.2 Since consumer utility does not depend on the consumer type, both low-cost
and high-cost consumers will prefer the same provider that offers a higher net utility. In stage 3, providers
submit their preferred consumer type (i.e. low-cost or high-cost consumer). Since all providers incur a
lower cost serving a low-cost type than a high-cost type, all providers prefer the low-cost type. In stage 4,
the platformmatches providers and consumers based on their preferences. We note that when the consumer
type is unknown, the provider’s preference ismeaningless. Analogously, when the provider type is unknown,
the consumer preference is based only on prices. Thematching procedure depends on whether the platform
and the players have knowledge about provider type and/or consumer type. Depending on the platform’s
knowledge, we distinguish three cases: no review, unilateral review scheme, and bilateral review scheme.
The matching process in each of these cases works as follows. In the no review case, neither providers nor
consumers know the type of the other player. Consumers’ pre-purchase expected net utility depends on the
expected quality minus the price. Since the expected quality is the same for every provider, consumers will
prefer the low-priced provider. On the other hand, providers do not know the consumer type, therefore
they have no preference. Then, the platform randomly picks a consumer of any type and matches her with
the preferred (low-priced) provider, until the preferred providers are fully matched. After that, consumers
are matched with the non-preferred (high-priced) provider. In the unilateral review scheme, the platform
and the consumers know the provider type, but the consumer type is unknown to them. Therefore, while
consumers provide their preference based on their net utility, providers prefer any consumer (no matter
what her cost type is).3 Then, the platform chooses a randomconsumer andmatches herwith her preference.
When a service provider of the preferred type is no longer available, the platformmatches the consumerwith
the other service provider type without violating the incentive compatibility constraints.4 In the bilateral
review scheme, every player knows the types of all providers and consumers. since all providers prefer low-
cost consumers, the platform chooses a low-cost consumer randomly and matches her with her preference.
Similarly, when the service provider type that a low-cost consumer prefers is no longer available, then the
platform matches her with the other service provider type. After all low-cost consumers are matched, the
platform repeats the same steps for high-cost consumers until either all high-cost consumers are matched
2We assume that when qH − pH = qL − pL, consumers will prefer a high-quality provider.
3An alternative unilateral review scheme is one in which providers know the consumer type but the consumers do not know the
provider type. We do not examine this alternative in this paper.
4We note that even when a consumer is matched with the other service provider type, equilibrium prices are set such that it would
not violate consumer’s incentive compatibility constraint.
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or there are no more service providers available.
We point out that the matching scheme seeks to accommodate the preferences of both providers and con-
sumers conditional on the information available to the platform. We adopt this matching process in the
main model in order to highlight the impact of two-sided adverse selection on the social welfare and miti-
gate the role of matching process (e.g., any social inefficiency caused by matching process) on the impact.
Moreover, accommodating the providers’ and consumers’ preferences could be beneficial to the two-sided
platform over a long run.
We can illustrate the matching procedure using an example. Assume that qH = 10, qL = 4, pH = 8, pL =
3, N = 80,M = 60, γ = ρ = 0.5. First, we consider the no reviews case. In the second stage, since there are no
reviews for service providers, consumers would prefer the low-priced provider (i.e., low-quality providers).
On the other hand, providers have no preference for consumers since the low-cost consumers cannot be
differentiated from the high-cost consumers. In the final stage, the platform randomly matches consumers
with the preferred (low-quality) providers. When the low-quality providers are fully matched, 20 remaining
consumers are randomly matched with the non-preferred (high-quality) providers. In this scenario, all low-
quality providers are matched and 20 high-quality providers are not matched. Moreover, 10 low-cost and
10 high-cost consumers are not matched.
Second, suppose the platform uses the bilateral review system for the same set of parameters. In the sec-
ond stage, consumers prefer the high-quality providers since UH > UL and submit their preference to the
platform. In stage 3, service providers prefer the low cost consumers since bilateral reviews enables them to
differentiate between low and high cost consumers. In stage 4, the platform considers the preferred types of
providers (i.e., high-quality), and consumers (i.e., low cost). The platform matches 30 high-quality service
providers with 30 low-cost consumers. Due to high demand, several low-cost consumers are not matched
with their preferred provider. Then, the platform matches the remaining low-cost consumers with 10 low-
quality providers. Finally, 20 remaining low-quality providers are matched with 20 high-cost consumers.
In this setting, all low cost consumers are matched, and 20 high-cost consumers are not matched with any
providers.
Now, assume the platform uses the unilateral review system for the same example. In stage 2, consumers
prefer the high-quality providers as before since UH > UL. In stage 3, providers cannot differentiate con-
sumers since there are no ratings associated with consumers. Therefore, providers do not have any prefer-
ence for the consumer type. In stage 4, the platform prioritizes high-quality providers since they are pre-
ferred by consumers. The platformmatches 30 high-quality providers with consumers randomly. Since the
proportion of low-cost consumers is 0.5, 15 low-cost and 15 high-cost consumers are matched with high-
quality providers. Then, the platformmatches 30 low-quality providers with the remaining consumers ran-
domly. Therefore, 15 low-cost and 15 high-cost consumers will be matched with low-quality providers. In
the unilateral ratings scheme, 10 low-cost consumers are not matched along with 10 high-cost consumers.
Hence, the platform is not able to match a certain proportion of low-cost consumers, which leads to ineffi-
ciencies in the market due to higher serving cost associated with matched high-cost consumers.
We consider two demand scenarios: high and low. In the high demand scenario, the total number of con-
sumers is greater than the total number of providers, and the number of low-cost consumers is greater than
the number of providers of any type. On the other hand, in the low demand scenario, the total number of
consumers is smaller than the number of providers of any type.5 The probability of high demand scenario
is φH and the probability of low demand scenario is φL = 1− φH . The parameters are depicted in figures 4
and 5 in the appendix.
5Clearly, other demand scenarios are possible, e.g., the total number of consumers is greater than the total number of providers,
but the number of low-cost consumers is less than the total number of providers. We do not consider such scenarios in this paper for
brevity and expositional clarity.
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Equilibria under No Review, Unilateral Review and Bilateral Review
Schemes
We first derive the equilibrium in each review scheme: no review, unilateral review, and bilateral review. We
then compare the equilibrium outcomes under these schemes to assess the impacts of the review systems
on various variables of interest.
No Review
In the no review scheme, neither providers nor the platform can differentiate the low-cost consumers from
the high-cost consumers. Therefore, providers have no preference for the consumer type. Provider j’s ex-
pected cost to serve a consumer is E[cj ] = (γθL + (1 − γ)θH)qj . In addition, consumers as well as the
platform cannot distinguish between the provider types. Consumer i’s expected net utility from provider
j is E[Ui,j ] = E[q] − pj , where the expected quality is E[q] = ρqH + (1 − ρ)qL. Clearly, all consumers will
prefer the low-priced provider since the expected quality is the same across all service providers. The ex-
pected demand for provider j, E[Dj ], depends on several factors such as the demand scenario, the number
of consumers, the number of providers, and the prices. Consider the low-demand scenario. Recall that in
the low-demand scenario, the total number of consumers is less than the number of low-quality providers
as well as the number of high-quality providers. In the no review scheme, higher-priced providers would
have no demand, and not all lower-priced providers would realize a positive demand. That is, if pL < pH ,
E[DL] = NLM(1−ρ) , and E[DH ] = 0. Similarly, if pL > pH , then E[DL] = 0, and E[DH ] = NLMρ . In the high-
demand scenario, the expected demand for all providers is equal to 1.
Weobtain the equilibriumprices by simultaneously solving the followingmaximizationproblems for providers,
where we use the superscriptNR to denote the no review case, ∗ in the superscript to denote the equilibrium
quantity, and the subscriptH or L to indicate the high and low-quality service providers, respectively.
pNR∗H = argmax
pH
E[DH ]((1− α)pH − qH(γθL + (1− γ)θH))
pNR∗L = argmax
pL
E[DL]((1− α)pL − qL(γθL + (1− γ)θH))
(1)
Lemma 1. In the absence of any reviews, the equilibrium prices in the high-demand and low-demand
scenarios are as follows:
pNR∗H p
NR∗
L
High Demand ρqH + (1− ρ)qL ρqH + (1− ρ)qL
Low Demand qH(γθ
L+(1−γ)θH)
1−α
qH(γθ
L+(1−γ)θH)
1−α
Proof: All proofs are in the appendix unless indicated otherwise.
Lemma 1 characterizes the equilibrium prices for high- and low-quality service providers in the no reviews
scheme. In the high-demand scenario, neither provider type has an incentive to compete onprices since their
capacity will be fully satisfied. Therefore, they set a price equal to the expected quality.6 In the low-demand
scenario, providers compete on prices to attract consumers. Notice that the higher-priced provider does not
realize any demand. Therefore, both types of providers engage in a Bertrand-like price competition. The
lowest price that a high-quality provider would set is one that would cover his expected cost after adjusting
for commission, E[cH ]1−α . Similarly, the lowest price that a low-quality provider would set is
E[cL]
1−α . Note that
E[cL]
1−α <
E[cH ]
1−α . However, if the low-quality provider sets a lower price than the high-quality provider, then
the consumers would infer that the lower-priced provider is of low quality. In that case, even though the
consumers do not observe the provider ratings, they can still infer the provider quality from the prices.
Consequently, a low-quality provider can attract a positive demand by signaling he is of low quality only by
setting a price that is less than E[cH ]1−α − (qH − qL). However, at these prices, the low-quality provider does not
6We assume that (1− α)E[qH ] > E[cH ], otherwise providers would exit the market, since they get negative payoffs.
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make a profit. Therefore, the low-quality provider would mimic the high-quality provider and set the same
price as the high-quality provider, i.e., E[cH ]1−α .
If E[q] < pNR∗j , then in the low-demand scenario, the market would break down because the consumer’s
expected valuation is less than the price charged by providers. This is consistent with the well-established
result that adverse selection could lead to market failure in traditional markets. We note that in the tra-
ditional adverse selection literature, it is assumed that there is no constraint on the supply and thus the
demand never exceeds the supply. This is analogous to the low-demand scenario in our model. Lemma
1 shows an additional result that in the high-demand scenario where the demand exceeds the supply, the
market does not break down because the price does not exceed the consumers’ expected valuation. Thus,
Lemma 1 suggests that the undesirable impact of adverse selection depends on whether or not the supply
can meet the demand.
Unilateral Review Scheme
In the unilateral review scheme, we consider that every provider’s type (i.e. high-quality, low-quality) is
truthfully revealed. However, service providers and the platform cannot differentiate between the low-cost
and high-cost consumers. Therefore, provider j’s expected cost to serve is E[cj ] = (γθL + (1 − γ)θH)qj , as
in the no reviews scheme. The expected demand function for provider j, E[Dj ], depends on several factors,
such as the number of consumers, and the difference in the net utilities obtained from the providers, i.e.
qH − pH and qL − pL. Consider the low-demand scenario. If qH − pH > qL − pL, then E[DH ] = NLMρ , and
E[DL] = 0. If qH − pH ≤ qL − pL, then E[DL] = NLM(1−ρ) , E[DH ] = 0. In the high-demand scenario, the
expected demand is equal to 1 for all providers. We obtain equilibrium prices by simultaneously solving the
following providers’ maximization problems.
pUR∗H = argmax
pH
E[DH ]((1− α)pH − qH(γθL + (1− γ)θH))
pUR∗L = argmax
pL
E[DL]((1− α)pL − qL(γθL + (1− γ)θH))
(2)
Lemma 2. In the unilateral review scheme, the equilibrium prices in the high-demand and low-demand
scenarios are as follows:
pUR∗H p
UR∗
L
High Demand qH qL
Low Demand qH − qL + qL(γθ
L+(1−γ)θH)
1−α
qL(γθ
L+(1−γ)θH)
1−α
Lemma 2 characterizes the equilibrium prices for high- and low-quality service providers when consumers
can observe ratings of providers. In the high-demand scenario, no provider has an incentive to compete on
prices since the providers are guaranteed to get demand and their price has no impact on which consumer
typewill be assigned to themandhence the expected cost. Therefore, they set a price equal to their quality. In
response to the equilibrium prices, all consumers prefer high-quality providers. However, there is no incre-
mental payoff of being the preferred provider, since thematch with a low-cost consumer is random and both
provider types will have full demand. In the low-demand scenario, providers compete on prices to attract
consumers. Notice that a provider with a lower net utility, qJ − pJ , does not realize any demand. Therefore,
both types engage in a Bertrand-like price competition. The lowest price that a low-quality provider would
set is one that covers his expected cost, E[cL]1−α . Similarly, the lowest price a high-quality provider would set
is E[cH ]1−α . Note qH − E[cH ]1−α > qL − E[cL]1−α . Therefore, a low-quality provider does not realize any demand even
at its lowest possible price. As a result, the high-quality provider sets the price, qH − qL + E[cL]1−α and gets the
full demand.
Lemma 2 shows that, both in low-demand and high-demand scenarios, the high-quality providers set a
price that cover their expected cost to serve and the consumers’ valuation is greater than the price they
pay. Therefore, the market does not break down in the unilateral review scheme regardless of the demand
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scenario. This finding is consistent with the result in the prior literature (e.g., Akerlof (1978)) that themarket
breakdown caused by adverse selection or information asymmetry between the sellers and consumers can
be eliminated ormitigated by eliminating the information asymmetry. Additionally, Lemma 2 shows that, in
our context, eliminating the information asymmetry on the consumer side by revealing the provider type is
sufficient to eliminate the market breakdown caused by adverse selection even though the adverse selection
is two-sided.
Bilateral Review Scheme
In the bilateral review scheme, we consider that both service providers’ and consumers’ types are truthfully
revealed. Therefore, service providers always prefer the low-cost consumers. On the other hand, the low-
cost consumers prefer the high-quality providers if and only if qH − pH ≥ qL − pL. Consequently, the
expected demand, provider profit, and the optimization model solved by the providers depend on whether
or not qH − pH ≥ qL − pL. Let us consider, for illustrative purposes, that high-quality service providers are
preferred by low-cost consumers in the high-demand scenario. Then, the platform will match the low-cost
consumers with high-quality service providers. However, since there are more low-cost consumers than
high-quality service providers, some fraction of the low-cost consumers will be matched with low-quality
service providers with probability NHγ−MρM(1−ρ) . Then, the simultaneous maximization problems for the service
providers in the high-demand scenario can be written as below.
pBR∗H = argmax
pH
(1− α)pH − qHθL subject to qH − pH ≥ qL − pL
pBR∗L = argmax
pL
(1− α)pL − qL(NHγ−MρM(1−ρ) θL + (1− NHγ−MρM(1−ρ) )θH) subject to qH − pH ≥ qL − pL
(3)
(or)
pBR∗H = argmax
pH
(1− α)pH − qH(NHγ−M(1−ρ)Mρ θL + (1− NHγ−M(1−ρ)Mρ )θH) s.t. qH − pH < qL − pL
pBR∗L = argmax
pL
(1− α)pL − qLθL subject to qH − pH < qL − pL
(4)
First, we find the conditions under which qH −pH ≥ qL−pL. Then, we get expressions for the expected cost
to serve for each provider,E[cj ], and expected demand functions,E[Dj ]. Finally, we solve for the equilibrium
prices and find the expected profit of service providers as well as the platform’s profit. The following lemma
summarizes the equilibrium prices in the bilateral review scheme.
Lemma 3. In the bilateral review scheme, the equilibrium prices in the high-demand and low-demand
scenarios are as follows:
pBR∗H p
BR∗
L
High Demand qH −
qL(M−NHγ)(θH−θL)
M(1−α)(1−ρ)
qH
qL if 0 ≤ ρ ≤ qHqH+qL
qL − qH(M−NHγ)(θ
H−θL)
M(1−α)ρ if
qH
qH+qL
< ρ ≤ 1
Low Demand qH − qL + qL(γθ
L+(1−γ)θH)
1−α
qL(γθ
L+(1−γ)θH)
1−α
In the high demand scenario, even though every provider is guaranteed to get a consumer, providers compete
for the low-cost consumers in order tomaximize their profits.7 We find that if the proportion of high-quality
providers is sufficiently large (low), then the low-quality (high-quality) providers compete aggressively to en-
sure that they get only low-cost consumers. We note that in the high-demand scenario, there are a sufficient
number of low-cost consumers that each provider type would get some of these consumers. The high-quality
providers lower the price to less than their quality and ensure matching with low-cost consumers only when
the proportion of high-quality providers is sufficiently low, i.e., when 0 ≤ ρ ≤ qHqH+qL . The reason behind
7We note that in equilibrium providers set a price such that the payoff from serving to a high-cost consumers is non negative.
Therefore, they would not turn down a consumer of any type.
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this finding is the intricate nature of the competition between providers as explained below. Suppose the
high-quality providers compete aggressively to ensure matching with low-cost consumers. As the propor-
tion of high-quality service providers increases, the number of low-cost consumers available to low-quality
providers decreases. This causes the low-quality providers to compete aggressively for the low-cost con-
sumers and reduce their prices, which, in turn, forces the high-quality providers to decrease their prices
also in order to maintain their competitive advantage over low-quality providers. Therefore, as the propor-
tion of high-quality service providers increases, the attractiveness of the strategy of competing for low-cost
consumers decreases for the high-quality providers. When the proportion of high-quality providers crosses
a threshold, the high-quality providers find it profitable to switch to a strategy of not competing for low-cost
consumers and charge a price equal to their quality. On the contrary, the low-quality service providers fol-
low a strategy that is the opposite of that of high-quality providers, i.e., they decrease their prices and attract
the low-cost consumers when the proportion of high-quality service providers is sufficiently high, i.e., when
qH
qH+qL
< ρ ≤ 1.
In the low-demand scenario, both types of service providers have incentives to lower their prices to attract
any type of consumer. However, since the prices are set such that pij = (1 − α)pj − E(cj) ≥ 0, the prices
can be as low as the serving cost divided by 1 − α, which gives the high-quality service providers an edge
in the price competition, since qH − E(cH)1−α ≥ qL − E(cL)1−α . Consequently, in equilibrium p∗L = E(cL)1−α and
p∗H = qH − qL + E(cL)1−α such that both consumer types prefer the high-quality service providers.
ImplicationsofUnilateral andBilateralReviewsSchemes forSocialWel-
fare
In this section, we compare the socialwelfare under no review, unilateral review, andbilateral review schemes.
Proposition 1. The social welfare in the unilateral review scheme is greater than that in the no review
scheme.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that eliminating the adverse selection suffered by consumers improves social
welfare. This is consistent with the well-documented result, shown initially by the seminal study of Akerlof
(1978) which also demonstrated that adverse selection suffered by consumers can potentially lead to a mar-
ket failure. Although our context is different and more general than that used by Akerlof (1978) and studies
that followed it, the result holds in our context as well attesting to the robustness of this finding.
The intuition behind our result is the following. The social welfare is equal to the expected quality minus the
expected cost to serve in our context. When there are no reviews about the providers, consumers can not
infer the qualities or prefer specific providers. Consequently, they are randomlymatchedwith a provider. In
the unilateral review scheme, consumers observe the qualities of providers anddecide accordingly. Thehigh-
quality providers set the prices such that they are preferred in equilibrium, which increases their demand
and the expected quality that the consumers enjoy. On the other hand, since there are more high-quality
providers that arematchedwith consumers under the unilateral reviews, the total cost to serve also increases
when compared to the no reviews case. Note that service cost is calculated by the product of consumer type
and the provider quality. However, the increase in the expected quality is higher than the increase in the cost
to serve because providers find it profitable to serve any consumer. As a result, the increase in the service
cost is lower than the increase in the expected quality, the social welfare under the unilateral reviews to be
greater than that in the no reviews case.
Proposition 2. The social welfare in the bilateral review scheme is lower than that in the unilateral
review scheme when the proportion of high-quality service providers is sufficiently high, i.e. qHqH+qL < ρ,
and the proportion of low-cost consumers is sufficiently low, i.e. γ < M(1−ρ)(qH−qL)qH(NH−Mρ)−qLM(1−ρ) .
Interestingly, we find that eliminating the adverse selection suffered by providers in addition to that suffered
by consumers does not necessarily improve the social welfare compared to when only the consumer-side ad-
verse selection is eliminated. This is surprising because the bilateral review scheme overcomes the problem
of information asymmetries on both sides - between service providers and consumers - and therefore, one
would expect that it would reduce the market inefficiencies and imperfect matches. However, social welfare
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in the bilateral review scheme is lower than that in the unilateral review scheme when the proportion of
high-quality service providers is sufficiently high and the proportion of low-cost consumers is sufficiently
low.
A closer examination of the two equilibria under the unilateral review scheme and bilateral review scheme
reveals that the equilibria in the two schemes in the low-demand scenario are identical. These findings have
two implications: (i) once the adverse selection suffered by the consumer side is eliminated, eliminating the
adverse selection on the seller side does not add to the social welfare if the demand is low or there is adequate
supply to meet the demand. It highlights the role of consumer-side adverse selection in contexts examined
by the bulk of prior literature where supply is assumed to be large enough to meet the demand. (ii) The
surprising outcome regarding the impact of bilateral scheme on the social welfare is solely driven by the high-
demand scenario. Furthermore, in the high-demand scenario, the expected quality in the equilibrium is the
same between the two review schemes. Therefore, the difference in the social welfare in the two schemes is
only determined by the misfit cost, or in our context, the cost to serve consumers.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is twofold. First, when the proportion of high-quality service providers is
sufficiently high, recall from Lemma 3 that while low-quality providers get only low-cost consumers, some
high-quality providers end up with high-cost consumers under the bilateral review scheme, because high-
quality providers do not find it profitable to go after the low-cost consumers. On the other hand, under the
unilateral review scheme, the low-cost consumers are randomly split between high-quality and low-quality
providers. Second, when the proportion of low-cost consumers is sufficiently low, a high (low) number
of high-cost (low-cost) consumers would be assigned to high-quality providers, compared to the unilateral
review scheme. While the cost for low-quality providers reduces, the serving cost for high-quality providers
increases under the bilateral review scheme. As a result, the social welfare decreases in the bilateral review
scheme compared to the unilateral review scheme under the conditions stated in Proposition 2.
BR > UR > NR
γ
ρ
UR > BR > NR
UR > NR > BR
φ = 0.8, θL = 0.25, θH = 0.75, NH = 85
M = 80, NL = 20, qH = 1.5, qL = 1
Figure 3. Social welfare comparison of all three review schemes.
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 2 and also compares the social welfare under the three schemes. In partic-
ular, it shows that the bilateral review scheme can hurt the social welfare even when compared to no review
scheme when both ρ and γ are small. These results challenge the intuitive reasoning for the social welfare
implications of two-sided adverse selection. One might argue that the negative effect of adverse selection
on society may be more severe when it is two-sided. Therefore, removing the asymmetry of information
on both sides using the bilateral review scheme should improve the social welfare more than removing the
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asymmetry of information on one side using the unilateral review scheme. However, we show that it is not
necessarily the case when providers strategically respond to available information about consumer types. In
summary, when the proportion of high-quality providers is sufficiently high, the high-quality providers set
higher prices such that they are no longer preferred by the consumers. Moreover, the proportion of low-cost
consumers in themarket is another critical factor. Specifically, when the proportion of low-cost consumers is
sufficiently low, the reduced cost to serve for low-quality providers does not offset the increased serving cost
for high-quality providers. These two factors combined suggest that the implications of two-sided adverse
selection for social welfare may not be as severe as those of one-sided (consumer-side) adverse selection.
Implications for Platform, Providers, and Consumers
In this section, we compare unilateral review and bilateral review schemes from the platform’s, providers’
and consumers’ perspectives.
Proposition 3. The platform’s revenue is lower in the bilateral review scheme than in the unilateral
review scheme.
The platform’s revenue is directly proportional to the average price charged to a consumer, or the intensity
of price competition under a review scheme. In the bilateral review scheme, the price competition is more
intense since service providers lower their prices in equilibrium to attract low-cost consumers and to reduce
their cost to serve. On the other hand, the lack of information about consumer type prevents the providers
from engaging in an intense price competition for low-cost consumers. Therefore, although the bilateral
review scheme reduces the asymmetry of information between providers and consumers, the platform may
not necessarily prefer this more efficient review scheme as it hurts the platform’s bottom line.
Proposition 4. Provider’s total profit is higher in the bilateral review scheme than in the unilateral
scheme when the proportion of low-cost consumers is sufficiently high. More formally, piBR∗ > piUR∗ if
and only if γ∗ < γ ≤ 1, where
γ∗ =
{
Mρ(qL(2−ρ)−qH(1−ρ))
qL(NH−M(1−ρ)2)−qHM(1−ρ)ρ if 0 ≤ ρ <
qH
qH+qL
M(1−ρ)(qH(1+ρ)−qLρ)
qH(NH−Mρ2)−qLM(1−ρ)ρ otherwise
Although the bilateral review scheme intensifies the price competition among providers, when the propor-
tion of low-cost consumers is sufficiently high, providers are better off even with low prices due to reduced
serving costs. More specifically, when the number of low-cost consumers is high enough, reduced cost to
serve consumers offsets the losses due to intensified competition and lower prices. In other words, we find
that competition for low-cost consumersmakes providers better offwhen there aremore low-cost consumers
in the market. Otherwise, i.e., when the proportion of low-cost consumers is sufficiently low, providers are
worse off in the bilateral review scheme, similar to the platform.
Proposition 5. Consumer surplus is greater in the bilateral review scheme than in the unilateral review
scheme.
Interestingly, consumers enjoy a greater surplus when their types are revealed to the providers. When con-
sumer types are presented to the providers by bilateral reviews scheme, providers lower their prices in equi-
librium to attract low-cost consumers. Due to intensified price competition and lower prices, consumers
benefit more in the bilateral review scheme.
Managerial Implications and Future Work
Our study has implications for practicing managers and researchers. From an academic researcher per-
spective, the study examines a less-explored variation of the well-known adverse selection problem. The
traditional adverse selection problem is one-sided. The information asymmetry we consider in this paper is
a two-sided adverse selection problem, which has not received much attention in the literature even though
it has been recognized. It is well-known that adverse selection leads to diminished social welfare and pos-
sibly market failure. One would expect that these detrimental impacts of adverse selection would be more
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severe under two-sided adverse selection than under one-sided adverse selection. Consequently, the con-
ventional wisdom would be that the bilateral review system would mitigate the two-sided adverse selection
problemmore than the unilateral review system. However, our findings show that this need not be the case.
From a practitioner perspective, we find that the online platform has little incentive to adopt the bilateral re-
view scheme on its own if the platform uses a matching algorithm that maximizes social welfare. However,
providers may demand from the online platform to adopt the bilateral review scheme when the propor-
tion of low-cost consumers is sufficiently high. Clearly, the matching algorithm used by the platform has
significant implications on the impacts of the review system. While a platform could justify the algorithm
that matches the social welfare as somewhat neutral that balances the interests of all parties, this algorithm
may not provide much incentives to the platform to make the player types transparent to everyone. On the
other hand, it is conceivable that a different algorithm could provide such information disclosure incentives.
Therefore, identifying an appropriate matching algorithm that benefits every player becomes important in
online peer-to-peer markets.
Future studies can extend this paper in several directions to provide additional insights about bilateral re-
views in the sharing economy. For instance, a future research direction would be to analyze a marketplace
that the platform uses a matching procedure that maximizes its own expected profit as opposed to the ex-
pected social welfare. In another extension, researchers would consider that the ratings do not reveal the
provider quality or the consumer type perfectly. Moreover, we assume that the providers charge one price to
consumers and the platform takes a fraction of that price as commission. In practice, providers may charge
multiple prices. For example, in Airbnb, hosts may charge a price and a separate cleaning fee. Furthermore,
it is possible that the providers could charge a deposit which could be refunded if the consumer behaved
responsibly. An analysis of such pricing schemes would provide much richer insights into the impacts of
information asymmetry in peer-to-peer markets.
Another future direction would be to investigate two competing platforms with different review schemes.
One possible scenario is that one of the platforms uses bilateral review scheme and the other uses unilateral
review scheme. There may be several interesting findings when analyzing such amarketplace. For instance,
providers whomay be multihoming between the platforms would prefer the platform with unilateral review
scheme since they may set higher prices. On the other hand, consumers would prefer the platform with
bilateral review scheme due to intensified price competition and reduced prices. At the same time, some
privacy-sensitive and high-cost consumers may choose to use the platform where they are not rated. An
analysis of the competing platforms may provide many rich insights and it would be a potential fruitful
research direction for the future. One other future research direction may be to endogeneize the quality
decision of service providers. We acknowledge that when service providers choose their quality given the
information strategy of the online sharing platform, there would potentially be several fruitful insights into
the impact of bilateral reviews on the social welfare.
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Appendix
Positions of parameters in high and low demand scenarios
Mρ
M(1− ρ)
M(1− ρ)
Mρ
NHγ M NH
Figure 4. Positions of parameters in high demand scenario.
NL Mρ
M(1− ρ)
M(1− ρ)
Mρ
M
Figure 5. Positions of parameters in low demand scenario.
Proof of Lemma 1
High-demand Scenario: Consider a low-quality service provider. There are three possible cases. 1) When
pL < pH , all consumers apply to low-quality service providers. However, since the low-cost consumers can
not be differentiated from the high-cost consumers, low-quality service providers will randomly bematched
with any type of consumers. Then, the probability that a match with a low-cost consumer will be γ and a
match with a high-cost consumer will be (1−γ). 2)When pL = pH , consumers will be have a preference and
randomly matched with any type of service providers. Again, low-quality service providers will be randomly
matched with consumers. Therefore, the probability to serve a low-cost consumer will be γ and to serve a
high-cost consumer will be (1 − γ). 3) When pL > pH , consumers prefer high-quality service providers.
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Then, high-quality service providers will be the preferred provider, and will be matched with consumers
with a priority. The remaining consumers will be randomly matched with the low-quality service provider.
Once again, the probability to serve a low-cost consumer will be γ and to serve a high-cost consumer will be
(1−γ). In all three possible cases, the expected cost to serve to a consumer will be the same. Therefore, there
is no incentive to lower the price, i.e. p∗L = E(q). A similar logic applies to high-quality service providers.
Then, the equilibrium outputs will be, p∗L = p∗H = E(q) = ρqH + (1− ρ)qL.
Low-demand Scenario: Since there are no rating information for the service providers, consumers are will-
ing to pay at most E(q). Consumers decide their preference based on the prices. Since price is the only
decision variable for the consumers and it is the low-demand case, service providers engage in Bertrand-
like competition. However, since the expected cost for the high quality service providers is higher than low
quality service provider, p∗H =
E(cH)
1−α . Low quality service provider can set a price lower than
E(cH)
1−α . How-
ever, when low quality service providers set a price lower than E(cH)1−α , consumers can infer that the low priced
providers are of low quality. Because, high quality would never set a price lower than E(cH)1−α . In that case,
consumers would apply to high quality service provider even with a higher price. Therefore, it is not prof-
itable for low quality service providers to set a price lower than E(cH)1−α , i.e. p∗L =
E(cH)
1−α . Then, the equilibrium
prices will be p∗H = p∗L =
E(cH)
1−α =
qH(γθ
L+(1−γ)θH)
1−α .
Proof of Lemma 2
High Demand Scenario: In high demand scenario, both service providers will have full demand. Therefore,
service providers have incentive to lower their prices only to attract low-cost consumers. However, in uni-
lateral ratings, low-cost consumers can not be distinguished from high-cost consumers since there are no
ratings for the consumers. Then, both service providers donot have any incentive to lower their prices in high
demand scenario under unilateral ratings. Then, the equilibrium prices are given as pUR∗H = qH , pUR∗L = qL.
Low-demand Scenario: There exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in low demand scenario. Fix pH ∈
[E(cH)1−α , qH ]. When qH − pH ≥ qL − pL, all consumers prefer high quality service providers. However, it is
not certain that a demand will be realized even for high quality service providers due to low demand. There
is a probability β3 that a consumer will be matched with a high quality service provider, β3 = NHMρ . Due to
low demand, high quality service providers will prefer any type of consumers, since no matter the cost to
serve to them is, it is always better to serve a consumer than not to serve a consumer. Then, piH(pH) =
β3((1−α)pH−E(cH)), where E(cH) = γθLqH+(1−γ)θHqH . When qH−pH < qL−pL, all consumers prefer
low quality service provider, so piH(pH) = 0. Therefore, it is alwaysmore profitable to set pH ≤ qH−qL+pL.
Moreover, it is always possible to find a price E(cH)1−α < pH ≤ qH − qL + pL, ∀pL ∈ [E(cL)1−α , qL]. Then, in
equilibrium p∗L =
E(cL)
1−α and p∗H = qH − qL + E(cL)1−α , as ϵ approaches to zero.
Proof of Proposition 1
Social welfare is calculated as the summation of the service provider’s profit and the consumer surplus. The
price does not have an impact on the social welfare, since the price consumers pay goes to service providers
and they neutralize each other in the social welfare calculations. Therefore, social welfare is calculated as
the quality of the service net the provider’s service costs.
High demand scenario:
WNR∗ = MρqH +M(1− ρ)qL −Mρ(γθLqH + (1− γ)θHqH)−M(1− ρ)(γθLqL + (1− γ)θHqL)
WUR∗ = MρqH +M(1− ρ)qL −Mρ(γθLqH + (1− γ)θHqH)−M(1− ρ)(γθLqL + (1− γ)θHqL)
In high demand scenario, social welfare is equal in the two review schemes.
Low demand scenario:
WNR∗ = NρqH +N(1− ρ)qL −Nρ(γθLqH + (1− γ)θHqH)−N(1− ρ)(γθLqL + (1− γ)θHqL)
WUR∗ = NqH −N(γθLqH + (1− γ)θHqH)
A comparison of the social welfare between the two review schemes is as follows.
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WUR∗ > WNR∗
N(1− ρ)qH −N(1− ρ)(γθLqH + (1− γ)θHqH) > N(1− ρ)qL −N(1− ρ)(γθLqL + (1− γ)θHqL)
(5)
It is clear that the social welfare in unilateral reviews is greater than the social welfare in no reviews.
Proof of Proposition 2
High demand scenario - Bilateral Reviews: There are two possibilities. (i) When qHqH+qL < ρ < 1, low
cost consumers prefer low-quality service providers. Therefore, the serving cost for the low quality service
providers is γLqL, whereas the serving cost for the high quality service providers is β2γLqH + (1− β2)γHqH .
(ii) When 0 < ρ < qHqH+qL , then low cost consumers prefer high quality providers. As a result, their cost to
serve is γLqH and the cost to serve for low quality service providers is β1γLqL+(1−β1)γHqL. In both cases,
the service quality ismρqH +m(1− ρ)qL. Then, the social welfare in high demand scenario under bilateral
reviews is calculated as follows.
WBR∗ =
{
MρqH +M(1− ρ)qL −Mρ(θLqH)−M(1− ρ)(β1θLqL + (1− β1)θHqL) if 0 ≤ ρ < qHqH+qL
MρqH +M(1− ρ)qL −Mρ(β2θLqH + (1− β2)θHqH)−M(1− ρ)(θLqL) if qHqH+qL ≤ ρ ≤ 1
(6)
High demand scenario - Unilateral Reviews: Due to high demand, all service providers fulfill their capac-
ities. Therefore, the service quality isMρqH +M(1 − ρ)qL. Since there are no reviews for consumers, the
service providers can not differentiate between the low cost and high cost consumers. Therefore, consumers
are randomly matched with service providers. Then, the cost to serve isMρ(γθLqH +(1−γ)θHqH)+M(1−
ρ)(γθLqL + (1 − γ)θHqL). Then, WUR∗ = MρqH + M(1 − ρ)qL − Mρ(γθLqH + (1 − γ)θHqH) − M(1 −
ρ)(γθLqL + (1− γ)θHqL) in high demand.
Low demand scenario - Bilateral Reviews: In low demand scenario, high quality service providers capture
all the demand. However, some of high quality service providers do not serve any consumers. Therefore,
the service quality will be NLqH . Some proportion of high quality service providers will be matched with
high cost consumers. The cost to serve the consumers isN(γθLqH + (1− γ)θHqH). Then,WBR∗ = NLqH −
NL(γθ
LqH + (1− γ)θHqH) in low demand.
Low demand scenario - Unilateral Reviews: High quality service providers will be preferred by the con-
sumers as before. Then, the service quality is NLqH . Since there are no reviews for consumers, service
providers can not differentiate the consumer type. Then, the cost to serve is calculated asNL(γθLqH + (1−
γ)θHqH). Finally,WUR∗ = NLqH −NL(γθLqH + (1− γ)θHqH) in low demand.
Comparison of social welfare: Notice that in low demand scenario,WUR∗ = WBR∗. We compare the welfare
in high demand scenario as below.
When 0 ≤ ρ < qHqH+qL
WBR∗ > WUR∗
Mρ(γθLqH + (1− γ)θHqH) +M(1− ρ)(γθLqL + (1− γ)θHqL) > MρθLqH +M(1− ρ)(β1θLqL + (1− β1)θHqL)
ρ(1− γ)M(qH − qL) + qLNHγ − qLMρ
M
> 0
(7)
This always holds since NHγ > Mρ. When 0 ≤ ρ < qHqH+qL ,WBR∗ > WUR∗.
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When qHqH+qL ≤ ρ ≤ 1
WBR∗ > WUR∗
ρ(γθLqH + (1− γ)θHqH) + (1− ρ)(γθLqL + (1− γ)θHqL) > ρ(β2θLqH + (1− β2)θHqH) + (1− ρ)θLqL
γ >
M(1− ρ)(qH − qL)
qH(NH −Mρ)− qLM(1− ρ)
(8)
Then,WBR∗ > WUR∗ only when qHqH+qL ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and γ >
M(1−ρ)(qH−qL)
qH(NH−Mρ)−qLM(1−ρ) . On the other side,W
UR∗ >
WBR∗ only when qHqH+qL ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and γ <
M(1−ρ)(qH−qL)
qH(NH−Mρ)−qLM(1−ρ) .
Proof of Proposition 3
Platform profit under bilateral ratings in high demand scenario can be calculated as below.
piBR∗R = αM(ρp
BR∗
H + (1− ρ)pBR∗L ) (9)
When we plug the equilibrium prices in the formula above, we calculate the platform profit under bilateral
ratings in high demand scenario as shown below.
piBR∗R =
{
α(MρqH +M(1− ρ)qL − (M−NHγ)ρqL(θ
H−θL)
(1−α)(1−ρ) ) if 0 ≤ ρ < qHqH+qL
α(MρqH +M(1− ρ)qL − (M−NHγ)(1−ρ)qH(θ
H−θL)
(1−α)ρ ) if
qH
qH+qL
≤ ρ ≤ 1
(10)
In low demand scenario, the platform profit is given below.
piBR∗R = αNL(qH − qL +
qL(γθ
L + (1− γ)θH)
1− α ) (11)
In unilateral ratings, the platform profit in high demand scenario is given below.
piUR∗R = αM(ρqH + (1− ρ)qL) (12)
Similarly, the platform profit in low demand scenario under unilateral ratings are given below.
piUR∗R = αNL(qH − qL +
qL(γθ
L + (1− γ)θH)
1− α ) (13)
Then, one can observe that in low demand scenario, the platform profit is the same under both review
schemes. However, in high demand scenario, the platform profit in unilateral reviews is always higher than
the platform profit in bilateral reviews. The proof is straight-forward when we compare piBR∗R − piUR∗R =
− (M−NHγ)ρqL(θH−θL)(1−α)(1−ρ) < 0, sinceM > NHγ, θH > θL, 0 ≤ ρ < qHqH+qL and 0 < α < 1−θH < 1. The same com-
parison also yields the same result when qHqH+qL ≤ ρ ≤ 1, since piBR∗R −piUR∗R = −
(M−NHγ)(1−ρ)qH(θH−θL)
(1−α)ρ < 0.
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